ABSTRACT Nowadays, the research of tradeoff between reliance on the tamper-proof device (TPD) and storage space in authentication scheme has become an interesting topic for vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). Most recently, to minimize the dependencies of TPDs and reduce the storage space, Zhang et al. proposed a conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme based on a multiple trusted authority one-time identity-based aggregate signature technique. It is more practical than other related schemes due to not depending on ideal TPDs. However, Zhang et al.'s scheme requires a fully trusted third party to participate in the authentication and member secrets generate phase, which may suffer from security bottleneck. To overcome this weakness, in this paper, we construct a realistic distributed conditional privacypreserving authentication scheme for VANETs using identity-based cryptography and short lifetime regionbased certificate. Comparing with Zhang et al.'s scheme, the proposed scheme has more security features but does not reduce computation and communication efficiency. The security analysis shows that our scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model. INDEX TERMS Vehicular ad hoc networks, authentication, conditional privacy-preserving.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a special case of mobile ad hoc networks, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) has received a great deal of attention from researchers in the academic and industrial field [1] . Generally, VANETs consists of a trusted authority(TRA), some distributed roadside units(RSUs) and a large number of vehicles. All vehicles in the VANETs equipped with On-Board Units(OBUs) are moving on the road. To improve the driving experience and ensure driving safety, vehicles will broadcast real-time traffic conditions, such as traffic jams, traffic lights, and traffic signs, etc., to nearby vehicles or RSU [2] . These communications are divided into Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication and vehicle-to-roadside unit (V2R) communication, which are controlled by short-range communications (DSRC) protocol [3] .
Because DSRC operates in the wireless environments, a malicious adversary could control the communication channel easily, i.e., he/she can eavesdrop, insert, block, and alter the transmitted data. Thus, VANETs are subject to various types of attacks [4] . To ensure that the received messages are transmitted by a legitimate vehicle and to protect the integrity of messages, it is indispensable to achieve message authentication in VANETs [5] .
Additionally, the leakage of vehicles' identities may reveal drivers' locations, movements, etc. The adversary can infer drivers' privacy from that information, which may cause serious consequences. For example, the attacker can infer the driver's actions trajectory and location information through vehicle social networks and burgles his home [6] , [7] . Thus, it is of great concern to protect vehicles' identities in VANETs. Although vehicle anonymity is a key issue in VANETs, it should still be conditional anonymity in the sense that a trusted authority should extract the real identity form the transmitted message. Because a malicious vehicle may send a fake message, which will misguide other vehicles into accidents [4] , [8] .
In the past several years, a series of remarkable conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme for VANETs (e.g. [4] , [8] , [9] ) have been proposed. He et al.'s [4] designed an identity-based conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme with batch verification for VANETs without using bilinear pairing, which could satisfy various security requirements. This scheme assumes that the OBU is a tamperproof device(TPD) and its secret keys are never disclosed. Obviously, it relies heavily on the TPD. Since the system private key is stored in all vehicles' TPD. Once key leakage occurs in any TPDs among these vehicles, the whole system will be compromised. Subsequently, Lo and Tsai [9] constructed a novel conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme without the dependencies of TPD. But it requires a large storage space to preload secret parameters. The reason is that each vehicle in VANETs broadcasts traffic-related messages to nearby vehicles or RSUs frequently in practice. (e.g. in a short time interval, such as 1 minute [10] , [11] ). Hence, the storage capacity is impeded by limited resources of TPD. To address these issues, Zhang et al. [8] proposed an authentication protocol based on multiple trusted authority one-time identity-based aggregate signature technique. It does not require strong realistic on TPDs. Furthermore, a huge pool of secret parameters is avoided in TPDs. It is more practical than the other two schemes [4] , [9] . However, it requires a fully trusted third party to participate authentication when the vehicle enters into a range area of a new RSU, which may make the trusted third party being a bottleneck of security.
Motivated by the above facts, in this work, we design a realistic distributed conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme for VANETs without the strong reliance on TPD, which also does not need ample space. Meanwhile, our scheme achieves authentication in authentication, and member secrets generate phase without the help of TRA. Besides, the proposed scheme can provide message authentication, vehicle anonymity, conditional traceability, and resistance to various attacks.
A. RELATED WORK
Until now authentication schemes based on cryptography techniques in VANETs can be divided into five categories: 1) ones based on the pseudonymous certificate; 2)ones based on group signatures; 3)ones based on symmetric cryptography; 4) ones based on identity-based cryptography(IBC); 5) ones based on hybrid methods [8] , [11] , [12] .
1) PSEUDONYMOUS CERTIFICATE BASED CLASSIFICATION
The authentication schemes based on pseudonymous certificate mainly utilize public key infrastructure(PKI). Raya and Hubaux proposed a typical authentication scheme based on anonymous certificate [10] , [13] . This scheme can provide message authentication and non-repudiation. To achieve unlinkability, the transmitted anonymous certificate must be changed at every session. Consequential, each vehicle in VANETs needs to preload a huge number of anonymous certificates. Besides, with time growing, the size of certificate revocation lists(CRLs) are getting longer, which will cause the problem of efficiency. Furthermore, every signature verification based this classification is independent. So the computation cost of verification is high.
2) GROUP SIGNATURE BASED CLASSIFICATION
Group signature is commonly used in VANETs to achieve vehicle anonymous. In 2007, Lin et al. [14] proposed a privacy-preserving authentication scheme based on group signature. The group manager who has the group master key can trace the real identity. However, the size of CRL is linear with the revoked vehicles. As a result, the running time of checking operation will take a long time. Subsequently, several authentication schemes [15] - [17] based on group signature have been proposed. Although these schemes [15] - [17] have much better performance than Lin et al. [14] scheme, they are still cost a lot of communication energy and computation resource of the group leader, which may make the group leader become the bottleneck of the system. Besides, the computation cost of verification using group signature is higher than those of the traditional signature.
3) SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY BASED CLASSIFICATION
The symmetric cryptography based schemes are subcategorized into three groups. The first group utilizes message authentication code (MAC) to achieve message authentication(e.g. [18] , [19] ). The second group uses hash function(e.g. [20] , [21] ) and the third group employs timed efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication(e.g. [22] , [23] ). Symmetric cryptography based schemes are more efficient than ones based on asymmetric cryptography. However, they have several inherent drawbacks like the problem of nonrepudiation and key management. Although Wang et al. claimed that their scheme [11] cam achieve non-repudiation only using MAC and hash function, it has a strong reliance on TPDs. Since Wang et al.'scheme assumes that the TPD is fully trusted and the signature messages include the current timestamp, a vehicle cannot deny the act of broadcasting message. Besides, like He et al.'s scheme [4] , every vehicle in VANETs stores the system key, the whole system will be in danger of occurring key leakage.
4) IDENTITY-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY BASED CLASSIFICATION
To address the problem of certificate management, identitybased cryptography (IBC) has been utilized in VANETs for authentication, which greatly increases the computation and communication efficiency. In 2006, Kamat et al. [24] presented an identity-based security framework for VANETs to provide authentication, non-repudiation, confidentiality and message integrity. However, this framework is the strong reliance on the infrastructure, which causes the signaling overhead overwhelming. To resolve this problem, Sun et al. [17] proposed an authentication scheme using identity-based encryption(IBE), which can achieve vehicle privacy and vehicle traceability. In 2012, Shim [25] designed an conditional privacy-preserving authentication(CPAS) scheme using pseudo IBC for VANETs. The efficiency of signature verification in CPAS is increased due to the batch verification. Later on, a series of authentication schemes for VANETs using IBC have been proposed(e.g. [26] - [28] ). These schemes still exist some limitations, such as impersonation attack and modification attack. Consequently, He et al. [4] constructed an efficient identity-based conditional privacy-preserving authentication(CPPA) scheme for VANETs without using heavy bilinear pairings, which supports both authentication and privacy protection simultaneously. But the CPPA scheme has strong dependencies on TPD. Once key leakage occurs in any TPDs of vehicles, the whole system will be compromised. In 2016, Lo and Tsai [9] developed an efficient conditional privacypreserving authentication scheme without reliance on TPDs. However, it needs a vast storage space to store its pseudo-IDs and the corresponding private keys.
5) HYBRID METHODS BASED CLASSIFICATION
Calandriello et al. [29] put forwarded a scheme combining pseudonym scheme with group signature, which generates pseudonyms on-the-fly. However, it still requires a large storage capacity for CRLs, and the expensive CRL checking remains a problem. Subsequently, a series of improved schemes [30] - [32] have been introduced to minimize the size of CRL. Although these schemes have reduced the broadcast CRL size, they still suffer from the expected significant size. In 2013, Wasef and Shen [33] designed an expedite message authentication(EMAP) protocol using PKI and HMAC. Since utilizing HMAC instead of CRL, the main advantage of the EMAP reduces the computation and storage cost compared to the previous schemes employing CRL [30] - [32] . However, this work still exists a limitation, which causes high packet verification overhead for the batch authentication scheme. Most recently, Zhang et al.'s scheme [8] , based on the approach of a trade-off between reliance on TPDs and storage space, combined one-time identity-based aggregate signature technique and certificate. This scheme issues short lifetime region-based certificate, which is valid only within the coverage range of the RSU. Obviously, it is more practical than the other schemes. However, it requires a TRA to participate authentication, which may make the TRA being a bottleneck of security.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, to balance the reliance on TPDs and storage space, we present a realistic distributed conditional privacypreserving authentication scheme for VANETs without the help of online TRA. The major contributions of the work are summarized as follows.
(1) Based on identity-based cryptography and short lifetime region-based certificate, the authentication and member secrets generate phase of our proposed scheme does not require the participation of trusted third party. (2) Since each vehicle's TPD only stores secret key within the coverage range of the RSU, which will update at a short period. So, the proposed scheme achieves various security requirements without strong reliance on TPDs. (3) Security analysis shows that our scheme does not only meet a variety of security requirements for VANETs but also resist various kinds of known attacks. (4) Compared with the previously related schemes, our scheme provides more security features but doesn't reduce computation and communication efficiency.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces security requirements for VANETs. Section III presents the detailed procedure of our proposed scheme. Section IV gives security analysis of the proposed scheme. The computation and communication costs analysis of the proposed scheme are discussed in section V. Finally, section VI concludes this paper. All the notations mentioned in our proposed scheme are defined in Table 1 .
II. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
He et al. [4] pointed out VANETs should meet many security requirements, including message authentication, identity privacy preservation, traceability, un-linkability and resistance to various known attacks. In addition to the security requirements mentioned above, we believe that an authentication scheme for VANETs should also satisfy the following security properties.
(1) Not strong reliance on TPDs: Although TPD is a tamper-proof device in VANETs, the security properties should not be a strong reliance on TPDs. Even if a vehicle is compromised, the whole system should not be in danger. (2) Efficient storage space: Because the vehicle's TPD is limited in computing power and storage. Meanwhile, the communications within V2V or V2R are frequently.
The authentication scheme for VANETs should consider the storage space. Ample storage space may be not suitable for constrained TPDs. (3) Key escrow freeness:Any legitimate vehicle cannot sign messages to forge another vehicle. The TRA can sign messages on behalf of any vehicle [8] .
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This section will describe the details of the proposed anonymous authentication scheme. Our proposed scheme consists of six phases: initialization phase, vehicle registration phase, RSU registration phase, authentication and member secrets generate phase, anonymous identity generation and message signing phase, and message verification phase. Each phase in detail will be introduced as follows.
A. INITIALIZATION PHASE
In the initialization phase, the root TRA choose an additive group of point G 1 with order q, and P is a generator of G 1 . TRA generates the system private key sk ∈ Z * q and calculates the system public key PK = sk · P. Then TRA chooses five secure hash functions h i : {0, 1} * → Z * q , (i = 0, 1, . . . , 4). The TRA stores sk into its memory as secret and publishes the system parameters
Notice that the system parameters are preloaded into the TPD of all vehicles and RSU.
B. VEHICLE REGISTRATION PHASE
When a new vehicle user V i wants to join a VANET, he/she needs to register for the TRA first. After registration, the TPD of V i must be initialized. The procedure of vehicle registration is described as follows.
(1) A new vehicle user V i submits the real identity RID Vi to TRA through a secure channel. (2) Upon receipt of the message, the TRA at first checks whether RID Vi exists in the vehicle information table. If it exists, TRA rejects the registration request. Otherwise, the TRA generates a set of random numbers named pseudo-IDs
where n is the number of elements in each set. Each element are generated as follows. First, the TRA generates n random numbers r 0 ,r 1 ,. . . r n−1 , and computes
Where 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. Next, the TRA updates the vehicle identity information table with the new entry {RID Vi , PID Vi , L t }, and preloaded
C. RSU REGISTRATION PHASE
When an RSU R j is deployed, R j is required to register in TRA. The procedure of sensor node registration is described as follows.
( 
(2) After receiving the authentication messages, R j at first checks the timestamp T 1 . After that, R j decrypts the ciphertext using the secret key k Rj by computing
. Then R j checks the validity of period L t and verifies whether the following equation holds.
If the equation (3) 
(3) V i generates a random number w i ∈ Z * q and computes
F. MESSAGE VERIFICATION PHASE
After receiving n traffic-related signature tuples {M i , TP ui , PPID i , t i , TP wi , σ i } (i = 1, 2 . . . , n), the verifier employs the system parameters {G 1 , P, PK , h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 } and R j 's certificate cert Rj to verify the validity of signatures. The batch verification of n signatures are described as follows.
(1) The verifier checks the validity of t i (i = 1, 2 . . . , n).
If it is invalid, the verifier rejects the signature. (2) The verifier chooses n random number a i ∈ {0, 1} l , where usually l = 80 and i = 1, 2 . . . , n. Then the verifier computes
where
If the equation (9) holds, the verifier accepts the signatures. Otherwise, the verifier rejects the signatures.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we will show our proposed scheme meets all the security requirements in section II. Because the initialization phase, vehicle registration phase, and RSU registration phase are executed in the secure channel. The proposed scheme may suffer security and privacy threats in the authentication and member secrets generate phase, anonymous identity generation and message signing phase, and message verification phase. The security of the anonymous identity generation and message signing phase and message verification phase are consistent with the [4] . Therefore, in this section, we demonstrate the authentication and member secrets generate phase is secure.
A. PROTOCOL PARTICIPANT
The proposed scheme involves four participants, the trusted authority TRA, the RSU R j , the vehicle V i , and the V i 's tamper-proof device TPD i . TRA is a trusted third party and it generates secure parameters. R j is located at roadside who is used to connect V i and TRA. TPD i is a trusted device and the secret information is hard to hack into.
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
The goal of an adversary A has three goals. One is that A can successfully forge a valid TPD i 's signature to R j . The other is that A can successfully impersonate R j authenticating to TPD i . And the last is that A can obtain the private signature key r Rj and forge the signature of V i . We assume that A is a probabilistic polynomial time attacker, and the feasible attacks are summarized as follows: (1 
C. SECURITY MODEL
Based on the literature [4] , we proposed a security model for our scheme. The security model of our scheme is defined by a game played by the adversary A and a challenger ζ . A can make following oracle queries.
Definition 2 (Security Protocol):
We say that our scheme is secure if the following properties hold:
• s V and s R are matching session, and they accept each other.
• The probability of
• The probability of distinguishing the pseudo-ID from a random number is negligible.
D. PROVABLE SECURITY
To prove the security of our proposed scheme, we assume that our scheme is defined by a game played between an adversary A and a challenger ζ . At first, we give two mathematical problems used for our security analysis.
Definition 3 (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem):
Given X = xP, where x ∈ Z * q , X ∈ G 1 , it is infeasible to compute x.
Definition 4 (The Computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) Problem):
Lemma 1 (Secure Vehicle Authentication): In the proposed scheme, if h 0 , h 1 , h 3 are ideal random functions and R S has been accepted, then there is no polynomial adversary against our proposed scheme who can forge a legal vehicle authentication message with a non-negligible probability.
Proof: We assume that the adversary A can forge a legitimate authentication message with a non-negligible probability . Then there is a challenger ζ who can solve the DL problem with a non-negligible probability.
Given an instance (P, PK = sk · P) of DL problem, the task of ζ is to compute sk. ζ sends the system parameters {G 1 , P, PK , h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 } to A. ζ randomly selects a vehicle's identity RID VC as the challenge identity and answers A's queries as follows: 
• RSend − Oracle: ζ operates according to the specification of the proposed scheme and returns the result of response to A. Based on above queries, A outputs the message {PID Vij , TVP ij , X , T 1 , V 1 }. ζ checks whether the following equation holds.
If it does not hold, ζ aborts this process. if A can forge the message {PID Vij , TVP ij , X , T 1 , V 1 }, A is able to successfully authenticate to the RSU. According to the forgery lemma [4] , [34] , the following equation can be got.
According to the equation (11) and (12), we can get
and
is the answer of DL problem. Obviously, it is a contradictory assumption. Therefore, there is no polynomial adversary can forge a legitimate vehicle's authentication message with a non-negligible probability.
Lemma 2 (Secure RSU Authentication:):
In our proposed scheme, if h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 are ideal random functions and s V has been accepted, then there is no polynomial adversary against the proposed scheme who can forge a legal RSU authentication message with a non-negligible probability.
Proof: We assume that the adversary A can forge a legal RSU authentication message with a non-negligible probability . Then there is a challenger ζ who can resolve the CDH problem with a non-negligible probability. Given an instance (P, TKP i = k Rj · P, B = x · P) of CDH problem, the task of ζ is to compute xk Rj · P. ζ sends the system parameters R0 is the identity of challenge. ζ answers the h i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) query, Register query as he does in the proof of Lemma 1. Then ζ answers other queries as follows:
• TSend −Oracle:ζ operates according to the specification of the proposed scheme and returns {X , CT 1 , V 1 , T 1 } to A.
• RSend − Oracle:ζ checks whether ID Rj = ID R0 holds. If not,ζ operates according to the specification of the proposed scheme and returns {CT 2 , V 2 , T 2 } to A. Otherwise,ζ aborts the game.
Based on above queries, if A can forge the message
A is able to successfully authenticate to the vehicle. There may be two cases to forge
A can guesses V 2 correctly without knowing k Rj . The probability of this case is equal to the probability of the hash collision. That is 1/2 l/2 , where l is the output bit length of h 0 . Obviously, it is negligible. A gets k Rj and asks the h 0 query. It means that k Rj · X is the solution to the CDH problem. Obviously, it is a contradictory assumption.
Therefore, there is no polynomial adversary can forge a legal RSU's authentication message with non-negligible probability.
Lemma 3 (Secure Anonymous Pseudo-ID):
In our scheme, if h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 are ideal random functions and s V and s R have been accepted, then there is no polynomial adversary against the proposed scheme who can distinguish the pseudo-ID and a random number with a non-negligible probability.
Proof: The adversary A asks the h i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) query, TSend − Oracle, RSend − Oracle and Test − query. ζ chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 1,ζ returns the pseudo-ID PID ik to A, otherwise, ζ returns a random number to A. If A can distinguish the pseudo-ID PID ik with a random number, he must know x or k Rj . According to the proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, if A obtains x or k Rj , he must know the solution of the CDH problem. Obviously, it is a contradictory assumption. Therefore, there is no polynomial adversary against the proposed scheme who can distinguish the pseudo-ID and a random number with a non-negligible probability. ideal random functions; (C) the DL problem is hard; (D) the CDH problem is hard.
Proof: Based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can know that there is no polynomial adversary can forge a legal vehicle or RSU if DL and CDH problem are hard. According to the definition 2, the proposed scheme is a secure protocol.
E. FURTHER SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME 1) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
According to Theorem 1, we can know that there is no polynomial adversary can forge a legal vehicle or RSU if DL and CDH problem are hard. Therefore, the vehicle and the RSU can successfully authenticate each other.
2) RESISTANCE TO FORGERY OR MODIFICATION OF MESSAGE
In our scheme, traffic-related messages are protected by signature value σ i . When the vehicle or the RSU receives the traffic-related messages {M i , TP ui , PPID i , t i , TP wi , σ i }, he/she can verify the validity and integrity by checking whether the equation
. Therefore, the adversary cannot forge or modify traffic-related messages, the proposed scheme can provide message integrality authentication.
3) IDENTITY PRIVACY PRESERVING
In the proposed scheme, the vehicle's real identity is encoded into pseudo-ID. Thus, no one, except for TRA, is able to get the real identity of the vehicle without the system private key sk. Besides, in the authentication and member secrets generate phase, the pseudo-ID of the vehicle is transmitted in the form of a cipher, which is changed with the timestamp. So, the adversary never even extract pseudo-ID without the secret x or k Rj . In this case, the RSU still get the vehicle's real identity even if he/she receives the pseudo-ID of the vehicle. In the anonymous identity generation and message signing phase, the pseudo-ID of the vehicle is protected by h 1 (u i · PK ||t i ). The adversary has to solve the CDH problem if he/she want to get the pseudo-ID of the vehicle. Therefore, this proposed scheme can provide identity privacy.
4) NON-REPUDIATION
Every message the vehicle broadcasted is bound to the protected pseudo-ID, timestamp and identity-based signature. Upon receiving the broadcast message, the vehicle or RSU will verify the correctness of the message. Anyone cannot forge the signature of the message without secret key r Rj . Besides, r Rj is updated in a short period. Therefore, if the TPD of the vehicle is compromised, the whole system cannot damage.
5) TRACEABILITY
In our scheme, TRA can trace the vehicle by extracting real identity from every broadcast messages
and extracts the real identity through the the vehicle identity information table. Therefore, the proposed scheme can provide traceability.
6) UNLINKABILITY
The proposed scheme adopts two random numbers(u i and w i ) and timestamp to support unlinkability for the vehicle. If the adversary has intercepted multiple broadcast messages {M i , TP ui , PPID i , t i , TP wi , σ i } of the vehicle, he/she still cannot link them generated by the same vehicle, where
The reason is that two random numbers and timestamp is fresh and different at every broadcast. Therefore, our scheme for VANETs can provide unlinkability.
7) RESISTANCE TO IMPERSONATION ATTACK
To impersonate a vehicle in the authentication and member secrets generate phase, the adversary must generate legitimate authentication messages V 1 . According to Lemma 1, there is no polynomial adversary can forge a legitimate vehicle's authentication message with a non-negligible probability if DL problem is hard. So the adversary cannot impersonate a legitimate vehicle in the authentication and member secrets generate phase. Similarly, it is concluded that the adversary cannot impersonate a legitimate RSU in the authentication and member secrets generate phase based on Lemma 2. For the anonymous identity generation and message signing phase, every broadcast message
According to the proof of [4] , the adversary cannot forge the legitimate signature without the private key. Therefore, our proposed scheme can be security in impersonation attack.
8) RESISTANCE TO REPLY ATTACK
The proposed scheme adopts timestamp to withstand reply attack. In the authentication and member secrets generate phase, the current timestamps T 1 and T 2 are included in the transmitted messages X , CT 1 , V 1 , T 1 and CT 2 , V 2 , T 2 . Thus, the receiver can verify whether the message is replyed by checking the freshness of T 1 and T 2 . In the anonymous identity generation and message signing phase, every broadcast message {M i , TP ui , PPID i , t i , TP wi , σ i } also contain current timestamp. The adversary cannot forge the legitimate signature value using t i binding without the private key. Therefore, our proposed scheme can resist against replying attack.
V. COMPARISONS
This section compares the qualitative property, computational costs and communication overheads of our proposed scheme [8] .
To measure the effectiveness of our proposed scheme, we present the comparison results in different tables.
A. QUALITATIVE COMPARISONS
The analysis of qualitative property includes TPD compromised, storage cost, using online TRA. In Table 2 , we summarize the qualitative property of the proposed scheme with other related schemes.
The purpose of TPD compromised is to evaluate the reliance on TPD, which states the security level of the whole system under the TPD compromised. In our proposed scheme, the TPD of the vehicle only stores local RSU's secret key. If this secret key is revealed by an adversary, only a limited number of vehicles who are in the same cover range of RSU can be affected. Besides, the secret key in the TPD will be updated in a short period. After this short period, the cover range of RSU has a new secret key, and the adversary may not extract sufficient secret information [8] . So, our scheme is the local danger under the TPD compromised. In He et al.'s scheme [4] , the master system secret key is stored in vehicle's TPD. Obviously, when a vehicle is corrupted, the whole system will be in damage. In Lo and Tsai's scheme [9] , the TPD of the vehicle stores only its own pseudoIDs and corresponding private key. It does not affect system security if its own secret leaked. Similarly, Zhang et al.'s scheme [8] is the local danger. Because the vehicle's TPD stores local RSU's secret key, which updates in a short period.
The storage cost includes the secret parameters stored in vehicle's TPD prior to development. To achieve convincing comparisons in storage cost, assume that the bit length of hash output, the validity lifetime L t and authentication key are 160, 64 and 256 bits, the bit length of the element in G 1 and G 2 are 160 and 1024 bits (because the security strength of the 160 bits elliptic curve is approximately equal to the 1024 bits RSA [12] ), respectively. In our scheme, the TPD of a vehicle needs to store pseudo-IDs PIDV i , corresponding private keys (TVP i , KV i ), validity lifetime L t and member secres (r Rj , L Rt ), which need (64n + 320n + 320n + 64 + 320 + 64) = 740n + 448, where n is the number of element in set pseudo-IDs. Similarly, the total storage cost of the other related schemes can be computed in Table 2 . Note, the storage cost of Lo and Tsai's scheme [9] in Table 2 uses a parameter m, which is similar to n and denotes the number of elements in set pseudo-IDs. Since the pseudo-ID in our scheme is used for authentication and member secrets generate phase, while one in Lo and Tsai's scheme [9] is used for the broadcasting message. Besides, the pseudo-ID in our scheme is communicated in ciphertext form, which can be reused again. Therefore, m is much greater than n.
When the vehicle enters into the cover range maintained by an RSU, it must achieve mutual authentication between the vehicle and the RSU. All of the above-mentioned schemes except for Zhang et al.'s scheme [8] do not need online TRA to achieve authentication. In Zhang et al.'s scheme [8] , the RSU has to complete authentication with the help of online TRA, which may make the trusted third party being a bottleneck of security.
From comparison in Table 2 , it can be concluded that the proposed scheme is superior qualitative property among the above schemes, which balances these three qualitative properties. Compared with He et al.'s scheme [4] , this proposed scheme is less dependent on TPD. If the vehicle's TPD is compromised, only the cover range of the same RSU cloud be affected. Meanwhile, our scheme needs less storage than Lo and Tsai's scheme [9] . Although Lo and Tsai's scheme [9] has the advantage in TPD compromised, it requires a vast amount of storage space for secret parameters. The reason is that a vehicle in VANETs may broadcast message frequently. So the number m in Table 2 is much greater than n in our scheme. Furthermore, Zhang et al.'s scheme [8] seems to be efficient in TPD compromised and storage cost. But in practice, it requires a fully trusted third party to participate in each vehicle authentication and member secrets generate phase, which may make the trusted third party being a bottleneck of security. Therefore, our proposed scheme is more suit for the realistic VANETs environment.
B. COMPUTATION ANALYSIS
For efficiency analysis, we compare the computation cost of our proposed scheme with the prior related schemes [4] , [8] , [9] . Because the initialization phase, registration phase and authentication and member secrets generate phase are not used frequently, we only compare anonymous identity generation and message signing phase, message verification phase. Almost all of the operations in our scheme and prior related schemes have appeared in He et al.'s scheme [4] , we continue to follow the running time of all operations in their scheme. To facilitate analysis, we use the following notations and their running time to measure the computation cost. The results of computation cost comparisons are summarized in Table 3 . From Table 3 , we can see that the computation cost of our scheme is as efficient as He et al.'s scheme [4] . Although the computation cost in Lo and Tsai's scheme [9] and Zhang et al.'s scheme [8] is less than our scheme, they achieve at the price of storage cost or heavy bilinear pairings operations.
C. COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare communication cost of our proposed scheme with the two prior related schemes [4] , [8] , [9] . To achieve convincing comparisons, we assume that the bit length of hash output and the timestamp t i are 20 and 4 bytes, the bit length of the elements in G 1 and G 2 are 20 and 128 bytes, respectively. Furthermore, assume that the size of signature messages are same in all comparison schemes. The results of communication efficiency comparisons are summarized in Table 4 .
In the proposed scheme, the signature messages Table 4 , we conclude that the proposed scheme is more efficient than Lo and Tsai's scheme [9] , Zhang et al.'s scheme [8] , and as efficient as He et al.'s scheme [4] in communication overhead.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a realistic distributed conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme for VANETs. The proposed scheme can provide various kinds of security requirements without an ideal TPD, such as privacypreserving, conditional unlinkability, and non-repudiation, etc. Besides, in comparison with Zhang et al.'s scheme [8] , the proposed scheme does not require a trusted third party to participate in each vehicle authentication and member secrets generate phase. The security analysis demonstrates that our scheme is secure against active and passive attacks. Performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme can be deployed in practice for VANETs while achieving a balance between security and efficiency. 
